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CONFRONTING THE BACKDOOR ADMISSION OF TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS AGAINST
AN ACCUSED: THE DANGER OF EXPERT RELIANCE ON INADMISSIBLE INFORMATION
Sarah E. Stout*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him."1 In order to conform to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause prior to 2004, a
prosecutor intending to offer a hearsay statement from an unavailable witness had to show that
the statement either fell under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or that the statement bore
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 2 This changed, however, when, in Crawford v.
Washington, the Supreme Court adopted an interpretation of a defendant's confrontation right
based on its understanding and application of the Framers' intent at the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment. 3 Under Crawford, the admission of a "testimonial" hearsay statement violates the
Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.4 Although this seems relatively straightforward, the
Crawford Court declined to provide an explicit definition of "testimonial" in its opinion.5
In the years following the Crawford decision, the Court has provided some illumination on
the types of statements it considers "testimonial." However, the Court has continually declined
to adopt an all-encompassing definition and, instead, it has determined whether a statement is
testimonial hearsay on a case-by-case basis.6 Because of this, the application of the
Confrontation Clause doctrine by the lower federal courts has been unsystematic. In many
cases, this has resulted in the use of judicial creativity to circumvent the confrontation
requirement, in favor of greater judicial economy. Unfortunately for defendants, this has also
resulted in a lack of judicial enforcement of proper confrontation protections.
The admission of expert testimony is one area where the lower courts have consistently
struggled to apply the Crawford requirement. Specifically, under Federal Rule of Evidence 703,
an expert may rely on inadmissible data in forming his or her opinion, if it is "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field."7 Prior to Crawford, the admission of this type of
evidence was justified because the judicial system viewed these statements as sufficiently
trustworthy, because other experts in the same field generally rely on the information.8 Further,
where an expert had been properly qualified under Rule 702, courts were comfortable assuming
the expert would effectively evaluate the probative value of the hearsay statement in reaching
Student at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, J.D. expected May 2012. Special thanks to
Professor Arthur Best, Professor David Schwartz, and James Stout for all of their feedback and constructive
criticism.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
3 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
4 Id. at 53-54.
5 /d. at 68.
6 See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009);
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829 (2006).
7 FED. R. EvID. 703.
8 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES 738 (3d. ed. 2009).
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his or her opinion.9 This type of evidence met the pro-admissibility, reliability confrontation
standard set out in Ohio v. Roberts 10 but, as this paper will explore, is not a sufficient basis to
justify admission without confrontation under the Crawford requirement." The Court has been
dealing with the issue of expert testimony since first deciding Crawford, through the decisions of
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 12 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico,13 and will continue to wrestle
with the topic in the pending case Williams v. Illinois,14 which was argued before the Court on
December 6, 2011.
This paper will examine the interplay between the Confrontation Clause and Rule 703,
and ultimately advocate for how the Court should rule in the pending Williams case to best
preserve the confrontation right for defendants as established in Crawford and its progeny. Part
II of this paper will provide a brief explanation of the problem that currently exists in reconciling
the Confrontation Clause and Rule 703. Part Ill will provide the necessary background of the
Confrontation Clause doctrine, beginning with Crawford. Part IV will discuss the history of Rule
703. Part V will detail the disconnect between the Confrontation Clause and Rule 703 by
analyzing the current treatment of this issue in the lower federal courts. Part VI will explore and
analyze the pending Williams case. Finally, Part VII will conclude the paper by looking at the
stakes involved for defendants when courts fail to hold the government to the Crawford
requirement, by exploring the importance of the judicial system properly protecting an
accused's confrontation right at trial, and by opining on the appropriate route that the Court
should follow in Williams.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
Rule 703 allows experts to rely on inadmissible evidence if it is "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." 15 If the
prosecution offers this type of expert testimony against a defendant, the Confrontation Clause
may be implicated if the defendant does not have the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant on the statements the expert uses as a basis for his or her opinion. 16 In general, courts
have treated the possible confrontation issues implicated when an expert relies on or discloses
testimonial hearsay statements at trial as inconsequential. 17 This leads many courts to largely
ignore true analysis of the confrontation issue, even if the opinion acknowledges the underlying
importance of the defendant's confrontation right. 18
Professors Christopher Mueller and Laird Kirkpatrick suggest that one possible reason for
the dismissive treatment of this issue in court opinions is quite simple, namely that many times the
basis of the expert's testimony is not "testimonial" and therefore the Confrontation Clause is not
implicated.19 For example, imagine there is an expert on gang structure, whose testimony at trial
relies on information gathered from interviews with former gang members over time. If the
statements from the former gang members that form the basis of the expert's opinion were not
9 DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNooKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE
190 (2d ed. 2011).
10 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
11 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-63.
12 557 U.S. 305.
13 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
14 No. 10-8505 (U.S. argued Dec. 6, 2011).
15 FED R. EVID. 703.
16 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, § 738.
17 KAYE ET AL., SUpra note 9, § 190.
is MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, § 739.
19 id.
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specifically related to the current case on which the expert is opining, those statements would
not be considered "testimonial" as they apply to the current defendant. 20 In contrast, if the
gang expert relied on statements from a co-conspirator during police interrogation relating to
the present case in forming his or her opinion, the statements would be testimonial, triggering
confrontation protections for the defendant.21
As the previous example illustrates, in the arena of expert testimony, what statements the
courts classify as testimonial becomes very important. Although experts are generally permitted
to rely on inadmissible facts and data in reaching their expert opinions under Rule 703, experts
should not be permitted to transmit or rely on testimonial statements that the defendant has not
had the prior opportunity to cross-examine. It is important to note that this paper limits its
evaluation of expert reliance on inadmissible data under Rule 703 to focus only on testimonial
statements on which the expert relies. This paper does not attempt to argue that courts should
no longer permit an expert witness to rely on other types of information or data that might
nonetheless be inadmissible under other evidentiary rules, so long as that information and data
are nontestimonial.
III. THE CONFRONTATION REQUIREMENT
The Supreme Court shaped the modern interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in the
2004 decision Crawford v. Washington. 22 A jury convicted Michael Crawford of stabbing a man,
who allegedly attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia Crawford. 23 At trial, the government introduced
a recorded police statement from Mrs. Crawford regarding the incident, which was made
during an interview at the police station. 24 She did not testify at trial, based on a marital privilege
statute in the state of Washington. 25 On appeal, Crawford maintained that the admission of the
recorded statement violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, because he did not
have the opportunity to cross-examine his wife's statements.26
Justice Scalia penned the majority opinion, and he openly admitted that "the
Constitution's text does not alone resolve this case." 27 The opinion began with a lengthy
historical discussion, which highlighted the fact that, under the common law, the admissibility of
an unavailable witness's statement largely depended on whether the defendant in the case
had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.28 This historical backdrop supported "two
inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment." 29 First, the Framers designed the
Confrontation Clause to "eliminate the use of ex parte examinations against the accused." 30
Second, "the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination." 31 This second inference became the analytical framework
that currently shapes all Confrontation Clause cases.
2 0 KAYE ET AL., supra note 9, § 192.
21 Id.
22 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
23 Id. at 38.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 40.
26 Id. at 38.
27 Id. at 42.
28 Id. at 45.
29 Id. at 50.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 53-54.
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Justice Scalia expanded on the second inference by stating that, according to the text
of the Sixth Amendment, the Confrontation Clause applies to "'witnesses' against the accused -
in other words, those who 'bear testimony.'" 32 "Testimony" was further defined as a "solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." 33 The
Court then explicitly included several types of statements as always being testimonial, such as
"ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent - that is, material such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially." 3 4
The Court concluded that in the present case, the statement played for the jury was testimonial
because police officers recorded Mrs. Crawford's statement in the course of an interrogation. 35
Justice Scalia stressed that although the goal of the Confrontation Clause "is to ensure
the reliability of evidence . . . it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It
commands . . . that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing it in the crucible of
cross-examination." 36 On one hand, if the statement at issue is nontestimonial hearsay, "it is
wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility" in determining the
admissibility of the statement pursuant to regular hearsay rules. 37 However, there is no such
flexibility when the out-of-court statement is testimonial because quite simply, "the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination." 38
The Court expanded the new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in the
combined 2006 cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, both of which involved
domestic violence situations. 39 In Davis, the issue was whether the statements made in the
course of a 911 call were testimonial. 40 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, began by stating
that there are differing types of police interrogations, distinguishable based on whether the
declarant was telling the police "events as they were actually happening, [or] describing past
events." 41 The Court concluded that it would not consider a 911 caller a witness providing
testimony because the primary purpose of a 911 interrogation is to resolve a presently occurring
emergency. 42
In Davis's companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, the issue was whether a victim's
statements from a battery affidavit were admissible when the victim did not testify at trial. 43 The
Court found this type of interrogation to be testimonial based largely on the status of the
questioning as a part of an investigation into a possible crime.44 Essentially, the Court held that
police interrogations or questioning are "testimonial when the circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no . . . emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." 4 5 Thus, the
32 Id. at 51 (citing WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 52.
36 Id. at 61.
37 Id. at 68.
38 Id.
39 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 818-19 (2006).
40 Id. at 826.
41 Id. at 827.
42 Id. at 828.
43 Id. at 820.
44 Id. at 829.
45 Id. at 822.
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"primary-purpose" test was born as a primary means of determining what out-of-court
statements are testimonial.
The Court once again examined whether to classify out-of-court statements as
testimonial or nontestimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes in 2011, in Michigan v. Bryant. 4 6
In Bryant, the Court offered further insight into what types of out-of-court statements it deems to
be testimonial. 47 Unfortunately, the majority opinion in many ways provides a less clear-cut
analysis than was already in place under Davis. Justice Sotomayor authored the majority
opinion, and for the first time in a confrontation case since Crawford, Justice Scalia filed a
dissenting opinion.48 In this case, the Court expanded on the principles set forth in Davis, holding
that statements made to police officers by a mortally wounded shooting victim were
admissible.49 According to the majority, the statements, which identified the defendant as the
shooter and described the location of the shooting, were not testimonial because the "primary
purpose ... [was] to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."50
In fact, the Court determined that "whether an emergency exists and is ongoing is a
highly context-dependent inquiry" and includes consideration of the type of weapon used and
the severity of the victim's injuries.51 According to the Court, one of the primary rationales for
admitting statements made to police officers in the course of an emergency is that the
declarant is not likely to fabricate statements under such circumstances. 5 2 In fact, Justice
Sotomayor writes that because "the prospect of fabrication in statements given for the primary
purpose of resolving that emergency is presumably significantly diminished, the Confrontation
Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible of cross-examination." 5 3
However, the Court is also careful to point out that whether there is an ongoing emergency is
simply one factor to consider when determining the "primary purpose" of the interrogation. 54
In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia claimed the decision "distorts [the Court's]
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in shambles."55 Justice Scalia reinforced his
previous understanding of the circumstances rendering an out-of-court statement testimonial
and maintained, "the declarant must intend the statement to be a solemn declaration ... and
he must make the statement with the understanding that it may be used to invoke the coercive
machinery of the State against the accused."5 6 Justice Scalia argued that the Framers adopted
the Confrontation Clause in order to prevent the admission of weaker, substitute evidence at
trial in place of live testimony, and that the Court in this decision allowed exactly that.5 7 Finally,
Justice Scalia expressed his fears that the Court's decision would lead to a return to the pre-
Crawford reliability standard for determining whether a statement is testimonial.5 8 He strongly
declared, "reliability tells [the Court] nothing about whether a statement is testimonial [because]
testimonial and nontestimonial statements alike come in varying degrees of reliability."5 9
46 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4 9 Id. at 1165, 1167.
5 id. at 1150 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
51 Id. at 1158-59.
52 Id. at 1157 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 828-30; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 65).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1160.
5s /d. at 1168 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
56 Id. at 1168-69.
57 Id. at 1171.
58 d. at 1175.
59 Id.
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The previous cases explain the steps that the Court has taken to define the contours of
testimonial statements for confrontation purposes; the following cases delve into the issue that
principally concerns this paper, namely the admission of testimonial statements through the use
of an expert witness. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, police arrested Luis Melendez-Diaz after
discovering "a plastic bag containing 19 smaller plastic bags" on his person. 60 At trial, the
government submitted into evidence "certificates of analysis" from the chemical testing of the
substance, which stated that "the substance was found to contain: Cocaine," without in-court
testimony from the analyst who conducted the tests. 6 1 Subsequently, a jury convicted Melendez-
Diaz of distributing and trafficking cocaine.62 On appeal, Melendez-Diaz maintained that his
right to confrontation was violated when the certificates were admitted into evidence, as he
had had no opportunity to confront and cross-examine the analyst who prepared them.63
The Court held that the "certificates" were plainly "affidavits" and therefore fell under
the protection of the Confrontation Clause because affidavits are testimonial. 64 Not only did the
analyst swear to the certificates before an "officer authorized to administer oaths," 65 but the
analyst created the certificates under conditions which would "lead an objective witness to
reasonably believe that the statement would be available for later use at trial." 66 Justice Scalia's
majority opinion explained that this was a straightforward application of the main principles laid
out in Crawford. 67 In order for the testimonial hearsay statements from the certificates to be
admitted, the analyst must be unavailable to testify at trial, and Melendez-Diaz must have the
opportunity for prior cross-examination.68
Importantly, the majority opinion then disposes of the various legal arguments presented
by the respondent and the dissenting opinion, three of which are particularly relevant to this
paper. First, the dissent suggested there is no need for the defendant to confront a neutral
"laboratory professional" whose scientific work is inherently reliable.69 The majority scoffs at this
statement because it suggests a return to pre-Crawford analysis where reliability alone was
sufficient to protect the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. 70 The Court thus
reaffirms a major holding of Crawford, stating that the Confrontation Clause does not require
any specific level of reliability for evidence, but rather "that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." 71 Second, the dissent suggests the
certificates should be admissible, without confrontation, under the business records exception to
hearsay.72 Justice Scalia again scolds the dissent, stating that the affidavits do not even qualify
as business records. 73 However, even if they did, the certificates would still be subject to
confrontation because the "regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence
for use at trial." 74 The declarant-analyst understood the prosecutorial intent behind the creation
60 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009).
61 Id. at 2531.
62 Id. at 2530-31.
63 Id. at 2531.
64 Id. at 2532.
65 Id.
66 Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).
67 Id. at 2533.
68 Id. at 2531.
69 Id. at 2536.
70 Id.
71 Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61).
72 Id. at 2538.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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of the affidavits.75 Finally, in addressing the respondent's concern that the criminal justice system
could not accommodate the result of requiring confrontation for these types of affidavits,
Justice Scalia asserted that "the Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminals
more burdensome, but... [it] is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience." 76
Two years later, in June of 2011, the Court decided Bullcoming v. New Mexico, with
Justice Ginsberg authoring the majority opinion.77 Donald Bullcoming was arrested on charges of
driving while intoxicated. 78 The main evidence against him was a "certificate of analyst" which
stated that his blood alcohol content was above the legal limit at the time he was in an
accident.79 The certificate was completed and signed by Curtis Caylor, and the certificate
required Caylor to affirm that " [t]he seal of th[e] sample was received intact . . . 'the statements
in [the analyst's block of the report] are correct,' and that he 'followed the procedures set out
on the reverse of th[e] report.'" 80 At Bullcoming's trial, the state did not call Caylor to testify
because he had recently been placed on unpaid leave and was no longer working for the
lab.81 In his place, the state called another analyst, who had not observed Caylor's analysis, to
admit the report as a business record.82
While Bullcoming's case was pending before the New Mexico Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz. 83 In light of that decision, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that the reports were in fact testimonial statements, but still refused to
uphold Bullcoming's confrontation right.84 The court explained several rationales for holding that
the admission of the certificate did not violate the confrontation clause. First, the court held that
Caylor was "a mere scrivener, who simply transcribed the results generated by the gas
chromatograph machine."85 Second, the court held that because Razatos, the testifying
analyst, was a qualified expert witness, he "was available for cross-examination regarding ...
the operation of the machine, the results of [Bullcoming's] BAC test, and . . . established
laboratory procedures." 86 Essentially, the court determined that Razatos was acceptable as a
"surrogate witness" for Caylor, and because he was a qualified expert, Bullcoming's cross-
examination would be meaningful and sufficient to protect his right to confront the witness
against him. 87
The majority opinion from the United States Supreme Court correctly treats Bulicoming as
a straightforward extension of the Melendez-Diaz holding. First, the Court made clear that Caylor
was certifying more than just the number from a machine and that the report he generated was
clearly testimonial.88 Further, the Court held that the reports at issue in this case resemble closely
the ones from Melendez-Diaz, and that the formalities surrounding the creation of the blood
analysis report were more than adequate to qualify the report as testimonial. 89 Therefore, based
75 /d. at 2539.
76 Id. at 2540.
77 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
78 Id. at 2709.
79 Id.
80 id. at 2710.
81 Id. at 2711.
82 Id. at 2712.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 d. at 2713.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 2715.
89 Id. at 2717.
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on Crawford, the actual analyst who completes the reports must appear at trial, regardless of
any apparent underlying reliability of the report.90
Next, the Court rejected the notion that Razatos was permitted to testify as a "surrogate
analyst." 91 Justice Ginsburg points out that it is clear that Razatos was not able to testify to "what
Caylor knew or observed about his certification," and the surrogate testimony would not be
effective at revealing any lies or lapses in Caylor's reporting. 92 The Court stresses that Razatos did
not even know why Caylor had been placed on unpaid leave. 93 Justice Ginsburg then mentions
that " [t]he text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the
confrontation requirement to be developed by courts." 94 Importantly, she emphasizes that this is
a more fundamental issue than if the state had asserted that Razatos had an "independent
opinion regarding Bullcoming's BAC." 95
Justice Sotomayor filed a separate opinion concurring in part with the majority. She
wrote separately to explain that she would have held that the report was testimonial because its
"primary purpose" was evidentiary, following in line with her Bryant opinion.96 Interestingly, she
also covered in her concurrence a set of circumstances in which the Court's opinion in
Bullcoming would not apply.97 Most importantly for this paper, she explained that this is not "a
case in which an expert witness was asked for his independent opinion about underlying
testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into evidence." 98 This scenario is precisely
the one raised in the most recent Confrontation Clause case to be heard by the Court, Williams
v. Illinois, which will be discussed in detail in Part VI of this paper.99
Although this line of cases provides some insight into how the Court defines the contours
of what are included as "testimonial" statements that require confrontation, the issue remains
largely open for interpretation by the lower federal courts.
IV. THE HISTORY OF EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY IN LIGHT OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703
Under the common law, courts did not permit experts to rely on inadmissible evidence in
reaching their conclusions and opinions. 100 However, Rule 703 has greatly expanded the types of
information on which the courts permit an expert to rely in forming their expert opinion.
Specifically, an expert may currently rely on inadmissible evidence in developing their expert
opinion. 101 Scholars have defended Rule 703 on the basis that courts should be able to rely on
"the reasonable judgment of the expert that the information source is sufficiently reliable to form
the basis for an opinion." 102 Note that the main thrust of this argument is that the information is
reliable.




94 Id. at 2716 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 2719-20 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
97 Id. at 2722.
98 Id.
99 People v. Williams, 238 111. 2d 125 (2010), cert. granted, Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June 28, 2011)
(No. 10-8505).
ioo KAYE ET AL., SUpra note 9, § 4.5.
ioi FED. R. EvID. 703.
102 KAYE ET AL., SUpra note 9, § 4.6.
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The passage of Rule 703 in 1975 presented a large expansion of what had been the
current practices in many states to limit expert testimony. As the committee note to Rule 703
explained, part of the rationale for the rule was to bring "judicial practice into line with the
practice of the experts themselves when not in court." 10 3 For example, a medical doctor would
typically base his or her diagnosis of a patient on information from many different sources,
including descriptions from the patient, statements from nurses, technicians and other doctors,
and the patient's past medical records, to name a few. 104 The committee note explained that
the large majority of these sources would be admissible into evidence, but "only with the
expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating witnesses."1 05
Essentially, because the physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon these types
of statements, "[h]is validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to
suffice for judicial purposes." 
106
In 2000, Rule 703 was amended by the addition of a slight restriction in regards to the
inadmissible data that an expert can rely on:
Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by
the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.107
The advisory committee note on the 2000 amendment explained this language was
added to "emphasize that ... the underlying information is not admissible simply because the
opinion or inference is admitted."108 In other words, inadmissible facts or data are to be
considered by the jury only as a means to test the opinion of the expert, and not as substantive
evidence. 109 The comment stressed that the amendment was not intended to prevent the
expert from relying on inadmissible evidence in the first place and that the Rule is not intended
to restrict an adverse party from presenting the underlying facts or data.110 Further, the
amendment was intended to "provide a presumption against disclosure to the jury of
information used as the basis of an expert's opinion . . . when that information is offered by the
proponent of the expert."111 Under the current Rule 703, whenever the proponent of the expert
testimony can establish that the "reasonably relied upon" test is satisfied, expert opinion
testimony may be based on facts or data that "would be excluded under certain other
provisions of the Evidence Rules." 112










109 Daniel W. Edwards, The Man Behind the Curtain: Confronting Expert Testimony, 1 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 9
(2011), available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/criminal-law-review/issues/v1-1/Edwards-Denv-U-
Crim-L-Rev-Spring-201 1.pdf.
110 FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.
'I Id.
112 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6273 (1st ed. 2011).
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V. THE CURRENT TREATMENT OF RULE 703 IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS FAILS TO MEET THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF CONFRONTATION
As we have seen, Crawford and its progeny have significantly altered the analysis a trial
court must complete in regards to the admission of statements that are testimonial hearsay. In
the past seven years since the Supreme Court decided Crawford, the circuit courts have
struggled in applying this new version of Confrontation Clause analysis to expert testimony,
particularly to an expert's reliance on inadmissible testimonial hearsay statements under Rule
703. In fact, nearly all of the lower court opinions on point have included varying degrees of
judicial gymnastics to avoid classifying the underlying information relied on by an expert as
testimonial statements subject to the defendant's confrontation right.
The analytical frameworks employed by the circuit courts can be narrowed into three
main types: (1) holding that Rule 703 allows an expert to side-step the confrontation issue based
on policy concerns; (2) distinguishing the facts of the instant case from Melendez-Diaz by not
admitting the underlying information on which the expert relied; and (3) finding that cross-
examination of the expert suffices to safeguard the defendant's confrontation right because the
expert has exercised his or her independent judgment on the information. In the following
sections, each of these analytical frameworks will be explained through the use of an illustrating
case, and then the circuit court method will be compared to what post-Crawford Confrontation
Clause doctrine actually requires, in order to demonstrate the shortcomings of these
approaches.
A. RULE 703 ALLOWS AN EXPERT TO SIDE-STEP THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE BASED ON POLICY
CONCERNS
In United States v. Williams, the defendant was charged with murder. 113 Williams objected
to the government's introduction of the alleged victim's autopsy report, as well as the testimony
regarding the autopsy report from a Dr. Tops at trial. 114 Although Dr. Tops did not complete the
autopsy or the report, the government used his testimony to introduce the report into
evidence. 15 Further, the government questioned Dr. Tops extensively on the details of the injuries
listed on the report.1 16 Dr. Tops ultimately opined as to how the injuries would have combined to
lead to the death of the victim. 117 The doctor who actually conducted the autopsy, Dr.
Ingwersen, was unavailable to testify at trial because she had retired. 118 The court stated in its
opinion that the autopsy report "fit squarely within the definition of testimonial hearsay," 119 as
expressed in Melendez-Diaz, based primarily on the fact that the doctor who completed the
autopsy, Dr. Ingwersen, was aware that the report would be available for later use at trial. 120
Further bolstering the conclusion that the autopsy report was testimonial, the court stated that
the report was marked with the formal characteristics of a document that would be submitted
at court in a criminal prosecution. 121 The court then explicitly commented that the report
"contain[s] testimonial statements that may not be admitted into evidence unless the
113 740 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2010).
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defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Ingerwersen at trial, or has had that
opportunity in the past." 122
However, the Williams court went on to make a dramatic claim, asserting that "while the
Supreme Court in Crawford altered Confrontation Clause precedent, it said nothing about the
Clause's relation to the Federal Rule of Evidence 703."123 The court concluded that so long as Dr.
Tops had a sound basis for his conclusions, regardless of the fact that the basis included
testimonial statements, his testimony would not violate the Confrontation Clause. 12 4 Although the
Williams court provided very little explanation for its expansive holding, in United States v.
Johnson, the Fourth Circuit provided some insight when it reached a similar conclusion. 125 There,
the court justified this analytical framework based on policy concerns, stating that while "some
of the information experts typically consider surely qualifies as testimonial under Crawford ....
[W]ere we to push Crawford [too] far ... we would disqualify broad swaths of expert testimony,
depriving juries of valuable assistance in a great many cases." 126
This is in blatant contradiction to the stringent test applied in Crawford in regards to what
the Confrontation Clause requires when a statement is testimonial. As Justice Scalia wrote in the
Melendez-Diaz majority, "the Confrontation Clause is binding, and we may not disregard it at
our convenience." 12 7 The only acceptable way for testimonial hearsay statements to be
admitted is when the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had the prior opportunity to
cross-examine him or her. 128 The Court explained in Crawford that the reasoning behind this
requirement is to ensure the reliability of the statement in the only way that the Constitution
deems sufficient: through confrontation. 129 Even in Bryant, the Court made efforts to define the
declarant's statements regarding the shooter as nontestimonial in order to justify admission
without meeting the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 130 Therefore, even in a case that
arguably stretches the outer boundaries of Crawford, the Court has been unwilling to admit un-
confronted evidence that it has classified as testimonial. The policy concerns of a jury's access
to expert testimony are not sufficient to overpower a right offered to protect an accused's
liberty interest as guaranteed in the Constitution.
B. NOT ALLOWING THE UNDERLYING INFORMATION ON WHICH THE EXPERT RELIED INTO EVIDENCE
In United States v. Pablo,131 the Tenth Circuit considered an appeal arising out of the
rape conviction of the defendant, who appealed the admission of both a DNA report and a
serology report, each of which was prepared by a different lab analyst. 132 At trial, neither of the
preparing lab analysts were called to testify, but the government nonetheless introduced the
reports through a third lab analyst, who was qualified as an expert to testify as to their
contents. 133 Pablo based his appeal on the then recent Melendez-Diaz holding that a forensic
analyst's statements contained in an affidavit were testimonial statements, requiring
122 Id. at 8.
123 Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Henry, 472 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
1
24 Id. at 9-10.
125 United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2128 (2010).
126 Id. at 635.
127 129 S. Ct. at 2540.
128 Id. at 2531.
129 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
130 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167.
131 625 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar 31, 2011) (No.09-2091).
132 Id. at 1290.
I33 Id.
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confrontation. 134 The government argued that Rule 703 permitted the expert to testify as to the
content of the reports despite the holding of Melendez-Diaz. 135
The Pablo court concluded that Melendez-Diaz was not necessarily dispositive in the
instant case. 136 The court distinguished the facts because here, the government never
attempted to move the actual reports into evidence, unlike in Melendez-Diaz where the
affidavits were admitted. 137 The court goes on to state that "the degree to which an expert may
merely rely upon . . . the out-of-court testimonial conclusions of another person not called as a
witness is a nuanced legal issue without clearly established bright line parameters." 138
Importantly, the court did admit that the reports themselves contained testimonial statements. 139
Ultimately, the court held that because the reports themselves were never entered into
evidence, the integrity of the Confrontation Clause was upheld.140 In justifying this holding, the
court explained that under Rule 703, an expert is permitted to rest his or her opinion on
inadmissible facts or data, "which may at times include out-of-court testimonial statements." 141
In the court's estimation, the protections built into Rule 703 regarding the disclosure of the
underlying inadmissible facts or data, including testimonial statements, ensure that such facts
would never be admitted for substantive purposes, but rather only as a means for the jury to
evaluate the expert's opinion. 142 Because of this limited purpose, the court concluded that "the
admission of those testimonial statements under Rule 703 will not implicate a defendant's
confrontation rights because the statements are not admitted for their substantive truth." 143
Again, this pattern of analysis is plainly at odds with post-Crawford Confrontation Clause
doctrine, particularly in light of the policy concerns expressed by the Court in Melendez-Diaz
and Bullcoming. 144 The reports, which the court readily admits were full of out-of-court testimonial
statements, were the sole basis for the expert's ultimate opinion in the case. 145 Although the
court attempted to distinguish Pablo from Melendez-Diaz because the government did not
introduce the full report into evidence, the underlying reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Melendez-Diaz is still applicable. In Melendez-Diaz, the Court stated, "confrontation is designed
to weed out . . . the incompetent analyst." 146 However, in Pablo there was no way for the
defendant to test the accuracy of the underlying reports, which constituted the sole basis for the
expert's conclusions. There could have been countless errors in the completion of both the DNA
and serology report, and there could have been additional errors in the recording of the results
by the original analyst. None of these errors would be adequately exposed to the jury through
the cross-examination of the testifying expert alone. In fact, Bullcoming would seem to be
dispositive on the Pablo facts and prevent the introduction of any type of forensic laboratory
report through the testimony of an analyst or expert witness who did not have at least some
hand in completing the testing.147 However, because the Pablo court rested the reasoning for
1
34 Id. at 1290-91.
135 Id. at 1291.
136 Id. at 1294-95.
137 Id. at 1294.
I 38 Id.
139 Id. at 1291.
1
40 Id. at 1292.
141 Id. (citing FED. R. EvID. 703).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705; Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537.
145 Pablo, 625 F.3d at 1291.
146 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537.
147 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
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the admission of the testimony squarely on Rule 703's shoulders, it could still fall into the gray area
that Justice Sotomayor discusses in her concurrence to Bullcoming. 148 This is precisely the issue
that the Court will resolve in Williams v. Illinois.
Whenever an expert relies on testimonial sources in forming his or her opinion, it is logical
to conclude that the expert accepts the truth of the out-of-court statements. 149 In fact, the jury
may even view the testimony as a "validation, expertly performed," of the out-of-court,
testimonial statements. 150 It is unlikely that in forming his or her opinion, the expert is relying on the
falsity of the testimonial statements or on the mere fact that they exist. 151 Therefore, the jury will
likely also accept the underlying data or facts as true, even if they do not consciously realize
that they are doing so. 15 2 This is especially true since the testimonial statements, although
undisclosed, have been "validated" by an expert in the field, who is presumably knowledgeable
about what source materials are reliable. 153 This demonstrates that the protections of Rule 703,
while perhaps acceptable in regards to nontestimonial information, are not sufficient to
safeguard a defendant's confrontation right when testimonial statements are at issue.
C. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE EXPERT IS SUFFICIENT BECAUSE THE EXPERT HAS EXERCISED HIS OR
HER INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT ON THE INFORMATION
The most common analytical framework employed by the circuit courts is demonstrated
in the case of United States v. Ayala. 154 A jury convicted the defendant, a member of the violent
street gang La Mara Salvatrucha ("MS-13"), of conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to
participate in racketeering activities, and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence.155
A combined federal and state task force arrested the defendant at the close of an investigation
that was "aided substantially by an informant ... Noe Cruz." 15 6 Cruz was a member of the MS-13
clique led by Ayala, the defendant. 15 7 At the trial, the government called three experts who
testified on the history and structure of the MS-13 gang.15 8 Each of these experts based their
opinions on interviews with former gang members, gang member families, and victims of the
gang, as well as the information gained in the current investigation. 159
The Ayala court created a test to use when applying Crawford to expert testimony,
namely "whether the expert is, in essence, giving an independent judgment, or merely acting as
a transmitter of testimonial hearsay."160 Several circuit courts have adopted this standard since
this decision.161 The court opined that so long as the expert reached an independent conclusion
in the case, it is immaterial whether the expert relied on inadmissible, testimonial statements. 162
1
48 Id. at 2721-23; Pablo, 625 F.3d at 1292.






154 United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 262 (2010).
i
55 /d. at 261, 264.
i
56 /d. at 261.
i
57 Id. at 261-62.
i
58 d. at 274.
159 Id.
i
60 id. at 275.
161 See, e.g., United States v. Turcios-Lazo, 378 Fed. Appx. 341, 342 (4th Cir. 2010); United States. v. Turner,
591 F.3d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 2010); United States. v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009).
1
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The rationale behind this analytical structure is that the defendant's cross-examination of the
expert on the stand regarding the expert's independent conclusion is sufficient to safeguard the
defendant's confrontation right. 163 If the expert's opinion is the result of the reliance on several
pieces of information and the expert had to exercise a degree of interpretation and
independent decision-making, the expert reliance is permissible, even if some of the underlying
basis of the opinion might be unconfronted testimonial statements. 164
However, once again, this strategy from the circuit courts fails to meet the high standards
required under current Confrontation Clause doctrine. The primary purpose of the Confrontation
Clause is to allow the defendant the opportunity to actually be confronted with each witness
against him and to test the witness's testimony through the "crucible of cross-examination." 165
Testing the expert's ultimate conclusion in cross-examination can do nothing to satisfy the
defendant as to the reliability of the underlying information on which the expert bases his or her
opinion. Cross-examination of the expert on whether the information is reliable will not be
effective as the expert is already required, under Rule 703, to find the information reliable, or at
least to be of the type "reasonably relied upon" in his or her field. 166
The shortcomings of this approach are further illuminated when considering that "even if
the underlying report is rich in detail, there are ways in which the testifying expert must assume its
accuracy in reaching his own decisions." 167 If the report transmits anything other than raw data,
such as interpretations of that data, and the testifying expert accepts these interpretations as
true, he is accepting and partially transmitting testimonial statements and information from the
report. 168 However, there is an inherent difficulty in this approach which is not present in the other
analytical structures. Namely, it is possible that some of the underlying information on which the
expert relies in these types of cases is appropriate. For example, in Ayala, the experts relied both
on information and data acceptable under the Confrontation Clause and on information that
would be barred by the Confrontation Clause. 169 The information the experts gained in previous
interviews, not specifically related to Ayala's activities in the gang, likely are permissible sources
for the expert to rely on. However, it is equally likely that the information gained from Cruz was
testimonial and directly implicated Ayala. Although it would be difficult for a court to ferret out
what types of information are acceptable for the expert to rely on, and therefore the extent of
the conclusions the expert can make, courts must engage in this type of analysis. This is what the
Constitution requires, and courts may not dispose of it in the interest of judicial efficiency.
VI. WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS
On December 6, 2011, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Williams
v. Illinois, which may prove to be the culmination of the Confrontation Clause's battle with expert
testimony.170 After a bench trial, Sandy Williams was convicted of two counts of aggravated
sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. 171 Dr. Nancy Schubert took
vaginal swabs from the victim immediately after the assault, which were sent to the Illinois State
Police ("ISP") Crime Lab for testing.172 ISP tested the swabs, which tested positive for semen. 1 73
163 KAYE ET AL., SUpra note 9, § 201.
I 64 Id.
165 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
166 FED. R. EvID. 703.
167 KAYE ET. AL., supra note 9, § 203.
i
68 id.
169 Ayala, 601 F.3d at 274-75.
170 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).
171 People v. Williams, 238 III. 2d 125, 128 (2010).
172 Id. at 129.
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The defendant was given a blood test several months later when he was picked up on an
unrelated incident.17 4 The DNA analysis of his blood sample was completed by a forensic
scientist, Karen Kooi, who made a DNA profile at the ISP Crime Lab. 175 Meanwhile, the vaginal
swab from the victim in the sexual assault case was sent to an out-of-state lab, Cellmark, for DNA
analysis on the semen. 176 The two profiles were determined to be a match, and Williams was
arrested. 177
At trial, Sandra Lambatos was qualified as an expert in "forensic biology and forensic
DNA analysis." 178 Among other things, she testified that the two DNA profiles were a match and
that Cellmark, as an accredited laboratory, was required "to meet certain guidelines to perform
DNA analysis."179 She further testified that those guidelines and controls would have been in
place for the defendant's particular sample. 180 The trial court judge stated "the DNA expert that
testified, was in my view the best DNA witness I have ever heard ... she was an outstanding
witness in every respect." 181 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the issues surrounding her
reliance on the Cellmark report went to the weight of her testimony and not its admissibility. 18 2
This was both because Lambatos used her own expertise to evaluate the two DNA profiles and
because the court determined that the burden is on the adverse party to elicit the facts
underlying the expert opinion on cross-examination. 183
The court then addressed whether the Confrontation Clause was implicated in the case.
The court asserted that the Confrontation Clause is only implicated if the testimonial statements
are offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 184 The state maintained that the only statements
offered for the truth of the matter asserted were the opinions of the expert witness. 185 The
testimony about the Cellmark tests was offered for the sole purpose of explaining how she
developed her own independent opinion, not for its truth. 186 The court then explained that it has
"long held that prohibitions against the admission of hearsay do not apply when an expert
testifies to underlying facts and data, not admitted into evidence ...." 1 87 The evidence offered
against Williams was the testimony of the expert and not the report. 188 Finally, the court
explained how Melendez-Diaz did not alter its determination of the issue. 189 In Melendez-Diaz,
the evidence at issue was a "bare-bones statement" that the substance was cocaine.190 The
court went on to explain that Lambatos used her own expertise to interpret the raw DNA data,
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and that the evidence at issue here was merely used to inform her opinion. 191 Therefore, there
was no Confrontation Clause violation. 192
The Williams case falls squarely within the second approach from the lower federal
courts. It is nonsensical to believe that Lambatos did not accept the truth of the DNA reports as
she was examining them. Saying that the reports are not offered for their truth would make them
entirely irrelevant because if they were not a "true" representation, she would not be making a
true match of the DNA. As mentioned earlier, there is a distinct risk that the judge or jury may
even view the testimony as a "validation, expertly performed," of the out-of-court, testimonial
statements. 193 In this case in particular, the trial court judge, who was serving as the trier of fact,
commented that Lambatos was the best witness he had ever seen discussing DNA. 194 It is nalive
to think that this would not affect his decision at least to some degree. It is very likely that an
untrained jury, faced with such a prepared and practiced witness, would accept her underlying
data for the truth of the matter asserted. Moreover, if they did not, her entire testimony would be
unfounded.
VII. CONCLUSION
The spirit of the Confrontation Clause as interpreted in Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and
Bullcoming would be "better protected through the testimony of the expert who wrote the
report rather than a surrogate . . . ."195 This applies equally to an expert who relies on the
testimonial statements of others. The Federal Rules' departure from the common law in allowing
an expert to rely on inadmissible facts, data, and statements is contrary to the Framers' intent at
the adoption of the Confrontation Clause. 196
In Derr v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals was faced with an issue very similar to
that presented in Williams. 197 In Derr, the defendant was convicted of several sexual offenses. 198
Physical evidence from the victim was taken to an FBI crime lab for serological testing by a lab
technician, who created a serology report. 199 The case was not solved, and seventeen years
later the physical evidence was submitted to the FBI lab again and an FBI analyst created a
DNA report, which was entered into the Combined DNA Identification System ("CODIS") and led
to Derr.200 Dr. Jennifer Luttman was involved in supervising a group of biologists who re-tested a
sample of Derr's blood, but she was not involved in the serological testing or the actual DNA
testing that led to the match. 201 Predictably, the state attempted to admit all of the forensic
data through the "surrogate testimony" of Dr. Luttman. 202 At trial, she was permitted to testify to
procedures used to create a serology report, a DNA profile, the testing procedures of both the
19i Id. at 281-82.
192 Id. at 282.
193 O'Brien, supra note 149, at 528.
194 Williams, 939 N.E.2d at 276.
195 KAYE ET AL., supra note 9, § 203.
196 Ross Andrew Oliver, Testimonial Hearsay as the Basis for Expert Opinion: The Intersection of the
Confrontation Clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 703 After Crawford v. Washington, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1539,
1540 (2004).
197 Derr v. State, 29 A.3d 533, 537 (Md. 2011); Williams, 939 N.E.2d at 270.
198 Derr, 29 A.3d at 536.
199 Id. at 537.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 538.
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serology report and the first DNA test, and her ultimate opinion that Derr's DNA profile matched
the suspect.203
On review, the Court of Appeals held that DNA profiling is essentially a statement that the
DNA being tested is the DNA of a particular person, and if that profile is used to match a person
to a crime in CODIS, then the analyst who created it must appear to be cross-examined.204
Further, the court directly addressed the interplay of Maryland Rule of Evidence 703, stating that
"to the extent that Md. Rule 703 offends the Confrontation Clause, such testimony will not be
admissible." 20 5 The court continued, asserting that "if the inadmissible evidence sought to be
introduced is comprised of the conclusions of other analysts, then the Confrontation Clause
prohibits the admission of such testimonial statements through the testimony of an expert who
did not observe or participate in the testing." 206 This case is demonstrative of how the Court in
Williams should rule, in order to protect defendant's confrontation right and stay true to the line
of cases following Crawford.
The cost to defendants when courts allow experts to rely on testimonial statements is
great. Under current circuit court approaches to Rule 703, the defendant is free to test the basis
of the expert's opinion through cross-examination, but if he does, he will be unable to object to
the disclosure of the statements to the jury.207 The alternative is to leave the basis of the expert's
opinion entirely unexamined. 208 Defendants are therefore left in a precarious position, and an
undue burden is being placed on the exercise of an accused's constitutional guarantee.
Defendants are forced into the position of deciding if it is a better tactical decision to risk
disclosure of the expert's underlying information to uncover any possible Confrontation violation
or, on the other hand, if it is better to keep that information from the jury for fear that the jury will
misapply the information as substantive proof. Thus, the criminal defendant is placed in a no-win
position, forced to choose between Constitutional guarantees and trial strategy.
In order to safeguard a defendant's Constitutional right to confront all witnesses against
him or her at trial, the Supreme Court should follow the lead of the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Derr. The Supreme Court must uphold Constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants,
regardless of the difficulties they may entail. The reason for this is simple, and no one has said it
better than Justice Scalia: "the Confrontation Clause ... is binding, and we may not disregard it
at our convenience." 2 09
203 Id. at 539.
204 Id. at 549.
205 Id. at 553.
206 Id.
207 Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries of Expert Opinion
Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 829 (2008).
208 Id.
209 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540.
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